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OPTIMAL RETIREMENT INCOME TONTINES
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Abstract. Tontines were once a popular type of mortality-linked investment pool. They
promised enormous rewards to the last survivors at the expense of those died early. And,
while this design appealed to the gambling instinct, it is a suboptimal way to generate
retirement income. Indeed, actuarially-fair life annuities making constant payments – where
the insurance company is exposed to longevity risk – induce greater lifetime utility. However,
tontines do not have to be structured the historical way, i.e. with a constant cash flow
shared amongst a shrinking group of survivors. Moreover, insurance companies do not sell
actuarially-fair life annuities, in part due to aggregate longevity risk.
We derive the tontine structure that maximizes lifetime utility. Technically speaking
we solve the Euler-Lagrange equation and examine its sensitivity to (i.) the size of the
tontine pool n, and (ii.) individual longevity risk aversion γ. We examine how the optimal
tontine varies with γ and n, and prove some qualitative theorems about the optimal payout.
Interestingly, Lorenzo de Tonti’s original structure is optimal in the limit as longevity risk
aversion γ →∞. We define the natural tontine as the function for which the payout declines
in exact proportion to the survival probabilities, which we show is near-optimal for all γ
and n. We conclude by comparing the utility of optimal tontines to the utility of loaded
life annuities under reasonable demographic and economic conditions and find that the life
annuity’s advantage over the optimal tontine is minimal.
In sum, this paper’s contribution is to (i.) rekindle a discussion about a retirement income
product that has been long neglected, and (ii.) leverage economic theory as well as tools
from mathematical finance to design the next generation of tontine annuities.
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1. Introduction and Executive Summary
As policymakers, academics and the public at large grow increasingly concerned about the
cost of an aging society, we believe it is worthwhile to go back in time and examine the capital
market instruments used to finance retirement in a period before social insurance, defined
benefit (DB) pensions, and annuity companies. Indeed, in the latter part of the 17th century
and for almost two centuries afterwards, one of the most popular “Retirement Income”
investments in the developed world was not a stock, bond or a mutual fund (although they
were available). In fact, the method used by many individuals to generate income in the
senior years of the lifecycle was a so-called tontine scheme sponsored by government1. Part
annuity, part lottery and part hedge fund, the tontine – which recently celebrated its 360th
birthday – offered a lifetime of income that increased as other members of the tontine pool
died off and their money was distributed to survivors.
The classical tontine investment pool is quite distinct from its public image as a lottery for
centenarians in which the longest survivor wins all the money in a pool. In fact, the tontine is
both more subtle and more elegant. For those readers who are not familiar with the historical
tontine, here is a simple example. Imagine a group of 1,000 soon-to-be retirees who band
together and pool $1,000 each to purchase a million-dollar U.S. Treasury bond (with a very
long, or even perpetual maturity date) paying 3% coupons2. The bond generates $30,000 in
interest yearly, which is split amongst the 1,000 participants in the pool, for a 30,000 / 1,000
= guaranteed $30 dividend per member. A custodian holds the big bond – taking no risk
and requiring no capital – and charges a trivial fee to administer the annual dividends. In a
tontine scheme the members agree that if and when they die, their guaranteed $30 dividend
is split amongst those who still happen to be alive.
For example, if one decade later only 800 original investors are alive, the $30,000 coupon
is divided into 800, for a $37.50 dividend each. Of this, $30 is the guaranteed dividend
and $7.50 is other people’s money. Then, if two decades later only 100 survive, the annual
cash flow to survivors is $300, which is a $30 guaranteed dividend plus $270. When only 30
1Sources: Weir (1989), Poterba (2005) and McKeever (2009).
2We state it this way for simplicity of exposition. Strictly speaking, the purchase should be the coupon
stream only, since the principal is never returned.
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remain, they each receive $1,000 in dividends. The extra payments – above and beyond the
guaranteed $30 dividend – are the mortality credits. In fact, under this scheme payments
are expected to increase at the rate of mortality, which is a type of super-inflation hedge.
The tontine, of course, differs from a conventional life annuity. Although both offer income
for life and pool longevity risk, the mechanics and therefore the cost to the investor are quite
different. The annuity (or its issuing insurance company) promises predictable guaranteed
lifetime payments, but this comes at a cost – and regulator-imposed capital requirements –
that inevitably makes its way to the annuitant. Indeed, the actuaries make very conservative
assumptions regarding how long annuitants are likely to live. In future (especially under the
regulations of Solvency II) annuity-issuers might have to hold capital and reserves against
aggregate longevity risk. In contrast, the tontine custodian divides the variable X (bond
coupons received) by the variable Y (participants alive) and sends out cheques3. It is cleaner
to administer, less capital-intensive and – in its traditional form – results in an increasing
payment stream over time (assuming, of course, that you are alive).
Underlying this paper is the argument that properly-designed tontines should be on the
menu of products available to individuals as they transition into their retirement years.
1.1. History vs. the Future. Lorenzo de Tonti was a colorful Italian banker who in the
1650s promoted the scheme which now shares his name. He described the tontine as a mixture
of lottery and insurance equally driven by fear of old age, and economic greed. Tontines were
first introduced in Holland, then very successfully in France4 and a few decades later, in 1693,
England’s King William III presided over the first government-issued tontine. In this first
government-issued tontine, in exchange for a minimum payment of £100, participants were
given the option of (a) investing in a tontine scheme paying guaranteed £10 dividends until
the year 1700 and then £7 thereafter, or (b) a life annuity paying £14 for life, but with
no survivorship benefits. In our view, the choice between two possible ways of financing
3In between the pure tontine and the conventional annuity lies the participating annuity which shares
some longevity risk within a pool using a long-term smoothing scheme. Unfortunately, the actual formula
for determining the smoothing mechanism is anything but smooth and lacks transparency. That said, self-
annuitization schemes (GSA), proposed by Piggott, Valdez and Detzel (2005) have been growing in academic
popularity.
4Source: Jennings and Trout (1982).
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retirement income is something that could conceivably be offered again in the future. Perhaps
the choice between a tontine (in which longevity risk is pooled) and a life annuity (in which
payments are guaranteed) is a paradigm for many of the choices retirees, and society, now
face.
Back to the 1693 tontine of King William, over a thousand Englishmen (but very few
women) decided to invest in the tontine. The sums involved weren’t trivial. The £100 entry
fee would be worth close to £100,000 today5. So, this was no impulse lottery purchase.
Rather, some investors picked the tontine because they wanted the skewness – that is, the
potential for a very large payout if they survived – while others wanted the more predictable
annuity income option. The oldest survivor of King William’s tontine of 1693 lived to age
100, earning £1,000 in her final year – and no doubt well tended-to by her family.6 See
Milevsky (2014) for more on King William’s tontine.
Our main practical points will be that (i) tontines and life annuities have co-existed in the
past, so perhaps they can in the future; (ii) there is no reason to construct the tontine payout
function such that the last survivor receives hundreds of multiples of their initial investment;
and (iii) a properly-constructed tontine can result in lifetime utility that is comparable to the
utility of a life annuity. Indeed, both the tontine and annuity hedge individuals against their
idiosyncratic mortality risk: The difference is that the tontine leaves individuals exposed to
aggregate longevity risk, while the annuity transfers this risk to the vendor – for a fee. If
this fee is sufficiently high, the tontine will offer greater utility than the annuity.
1.2. Outline of the Paper. To our knowledge, we are the first to derive the properties of
an optimized tontine payout structure, in contrast to the optimal life annuity which is well-
known in the literature. We believe this is part of the “optimal insurance design” literature,
similar to the recent paper by Bernard, et. al. (2015). An interesting insurance product,
that lies between a tontine and annuity, is the pooled annuity. Stamos (2008) analyzes the
optimal design of such a pool, while Donnelly, Guillen and Nielsen (2014) compare its utility
to that of alternatives and a recent article by Donnelly (2015) examines the “fairness” of
pooled annuity funds in general. As with a tontine, pooled annuity funds insulate the issuer
5Source: Lewin (2003).
6Source: Finlaison (1829).
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from longevity risk. These hybrid designs yield utility intermediate between that of a tontine
and an annuity, at the expense of a more complex product design (from the client point of
view). We will discuss this, and review the broader literature, in Section 5.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 very briefly describes the
highlights of the first ever English government tontine of 1693, which interestingly had some
aspects of our optimal tontine. It also provides some motivation and colour to the paper.
Section 3 is the theoretical core of the paper, which derives the properties of the optimal
tontine structure and compares this optimal structure with the life annuity. Section 4 uses
and applies the results from Section 3 and addresses how 21st-century tontines might be
constructed. Section 6 concludes the paper and Section 7 is an appendix with most proofs
and derivations.
2. The First English Tontine: Non-Flat Payout
In early 1693, during the fourth year of the reign of King William III and Queen Mary II,
the English Parliament passed the so-called Million Act, which was an attempt to raise one
million pounds towards carrying on the war against France. The Million Act specified that
prior to May 1, 1693, any British native or foreigner could purchase a tontine share from the
Exchequer for £100 and thus gain entry into the first British government tontine scheme.
For £100 an investor could select any nominee of any age – including the investor himself
– on whose life the tontine would be contingent. Dividend payments would be distributed to
the investor as long as the nominee was still alive. Now, to put the magnitude of the minimal
£100 investment in perspective, the average annual wage of building laborers in England
during the latter part of the 17th century was approximately £16 and a few shillings per
year7 – so the entry investment in the tontine pool far exceeded the average industrial wage,
and the annual dividends alone might serve as a decent pension for a common labourer.
Accordingly, it is quite plausible to argue that the 1693 tontine was an investment for the
rich and perhaps even one of the first exclusive hedge funds.
This was a simpler structure compared to the original tontine scheme envisioned by
Lorenzo de Tonti in the year 1653, which involved multiple classes. In the 1693 English
7Source: Lewin (2003).
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tontine, each share of £100 would entitle the investor to an annual dividend of £10 for seven
years (until June 1700), after which the dividends would be reduced to £7 per share. The
10% and 7% tontine dividend rate exceeded prevailing (market) interest rates in England at
the end of the 17th century, which were officially capped at 6%.8 Note the declining structure
of the interest payments, which is a preview of our soon-to-come discussion (in Section 3)
about the optimal tontine payout function.
Moving on to the annuity side of the offering, to further entice investors to participate in
the tontine scheme, the Act included a unique “sweetener” or bonus provision. It stipulated
that if the entire £1,000,000 target wasn’t subscribed by May 1693 – thus reducing the size
of the lottery payoff for the final survivor – the investors who had enrolled in the tontine
during the six-month subscription period (starting in November 1692) would have the option
of converting their £100 tontine shares into a life annuity paying £14 per year. Under this
alternative, the 14% dividend payments were structured as a conventional life annuity with
no group survivorship benefits or tontine features. (Think of a single premium life annuity.)
This “option to choose” between a tontine and a life annuity is quite intriguing and fodder
for further research.
Alas, the funds raised by early May 1963 fell far short of the million-pound target. Ac-
cording to records maintained by the Office of the Exchequer, stored within the Archives
of the British Library9, a total of only £377,000 was subscribed and approximately 3,750
people were nominated10 to the tontine prior to May 1693. This then triggered the option
to exchange the tontine into a 14% life annuity.
Interestingly, it seems that a total of 1,013 nominees (representing 1,081 tontine shares)
remained in the original 10%/7% tontine, while the other two-thirds elected to convert their
tontine shares into a 14% life annuity contingent on the same nominee. (See Milevsky (2014)
for an extensive historical discussion of the 1693 tontine, the characteristics of investors who
selected the tontine versus the annuity and some of the empirical factors driving the decisions
made by participants. Here we only describe the highlights.)
8Source: Homer and Sylla (2005).
9Source: Dickson (1967).
10Note that one nominee could have multiple shares of £100 contingent on their life.
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At first glance, it is rather puzzling why anyone would stay in the tontine pool instead of
switching to the life annuity. On a present-value basis, a cash flow of £10 for seven years
and £7 per annum thereafter is much less valuable compared to £14 per annum for life.
As discussed in Milevsky (2014), the actuarial present value of the 10%/7% combination at
the 6% official interest rate was worth approximately £133 at the (typical nominee) age of
ten, whereas the value of the life annuity was worth almost £185. (Remember, the original
investment was £100.) It should come as no surprise that the British government was losing
money on these 14% annuities11 – and they were offering these terms to anyone, regardless
of how young they were. Why did anyone stay in the tontine pool?
Could differing views on mortality and/or risk aversion explain why some investors switched,
while others didn’t? Can a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational choice be found?
The framework we will introduce in Section 3 might help shed light on this decision, or at
least rationalize the choice.
Motivated by the historical tontine, in the next section we present an economic theory
to describe and understand the choice theory illuminating who might elect to participate in
a tontine and who might choose a life annuity, as well as the properties of a tontine that
are likely to generate the highest lifetime utility. To pre-empt the result, we will show that
although the life annuity clearly dominated the tontine in terms of lifetime utility, a declining
tontine payout structure (as in the 1693 tontine) is in fact optimal. So, having a tontine that
pays 10% in the first few years (to the entire pool) and then 7% for the remaining years (to
the entire pool) is a historical aberration but will be shown to be based in sound economic
theory.
3. Tontine vs. Annuity: Economic Theory
We assume an objective survival function tpx, for an individual aged x to survive t years.
One purpose of the tontine structure is to insulate the issuer from the risk of a stochastic
(or simply mis-specified) survival function, but in this paper we assume tpx is given, and
applies to all individuals. We leave for future work the exploration of subjective vs. objective
survival rates, or stochastic hazard rates. We assume that the tontine pays out continuously,
11Source: Finlaison (1829).
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as opposed to quarterly or monthly. For simplicity, we assume a constant risk-free interest
rate r, though it would be simple to incorporate a term structure (all funds contributed are
invested at time 0, so payouts could be funded from a static bond portfolio as easily as from a
money market account). Our basic annuity involves annuitants (who are also the nominees)
each paying $1 to the insurer initially, and receiving in return an income stream of c(t) dt
for life. The constraint on these annuities is that they are fairly priced, in other words that
with a sufficiently large client base, the initial payments invested at the risk-free rate will
fund the called-for payments in perpetuity (later we discuss the implications of insurance
loadings). This implies a constraint on the annuity payout function c(t), namely that
(1)
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx c(t) dt = 1.
Though c(t) is the payout rate per survivor, note that the payout rate per initial dollar
invested is tpx c(t). We will return to this later.
Letting u(c) denote the instantaneous utility of consumption (a.k.a. the felicity function),
a rational annuitant (with lifetime ζ) having no bequest motive will choose a life annuity
payout function for which c(t) maximizes the discounted lifetime utility:
(2) E[
∫ ζ
0
e−rtu(c(t)) dt] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx u(c(t)) dt
where r is (also) the subjective discount rate (SDR), all subject to the constraint (1).
By the Euler-Lagrange theorem12, this implies the existence of a constant λ such that
(3) e−rttpx u′(c(t)) = λe−rttpx for every t.
In other words, u′(c(t)) = λ is constant, so provided that utility function u(c) is strictly
concave, the optimal annuity payout function c(t) is also constant. That constant is now
determined by (1), showing the following:
Theorem 1. Optimized life annuities have constant c(t) ≡ c0, where
c0 =
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx dt
]−1
.
12Source: Elsgolc (2007) page 51 or Gelfand and Fomin (2000), page 15.
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This result can be traced back to Yaari (1965) who showed that the optimal (retirement)
consumption profile is constant (flat) and that 100% of wealth is annuitized when there is no
bequest motive. For more details and an alternate proof, see the excellent book by Cannon
and Tonks (2008) and specifically the discussion on annuity demand theory in chapter 7.
3.1. Optimal Tontine Payout. In practice, insurance companies funding the life annuity
c(t) are exposed to both systematic longevity risk (due to randomness or uncertainty in tpx),
model risk (the risk that tpx is mis-specified), as well as re-investment or interest rate risk
(which is the uncertainty in r over long horizons). The latter is not our focus here, so we
will continue to assume that r is a given constant for most of what follows. Note that even
if re-investment rates were known with certainty, the insurance company would likely pay
out less than the c(t) implied by equation (1) as a result of required capital and reserves,
effectively lowering the lifetime utility of the (annuity and the) retiree.
This brings us to the tontine structures we will consider as an alternative, in which a
predetermined dollar amount is shared among survivors at every t. Let d(t) be the rate
at which funds are paid out per initial dollar invested, a.k.a. the tontine payout function.
Our main point in this paper is that there is no reason for tontine payout function to be a
constant fixed percentage of the initial dollar invested (e.g. 4% or 7%), as it was historically.
In fact, we can pose the same question as considered above for annuities: what d(t) is optimal
for subscribers, subject to the constraint that sponsors of the tontine cannot sustain a loss?
Note that the natural comparison is now between d(t) and tpx c(t), where c(t) is the optimal
annuity payout found above.
Suppose there are initially n subscribers to the tontine scheme, each depositing a dollar
with the tontine sponsor. Let N(t) be the random number of live subscribers at time t.
Consider one of these subscribers. Given that this individual is alive, N(t) − 1 ∼ Bin(n −
1, tpx). In other words, the number of other (live) subscribers at any time t is binomially
distributed with probability parameter tpx.
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So, as we found for the life annuity, this individual’s discounted lifetime utility is
E[
∫ ζ
0
e−rtu
(nd(t)
N(t)
)
dt] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxE[u
(nd(t)
N(t)
)
| ζ > t] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
tp
k
x(1− tpx)n−1−ku
(nd(t)
k + 1
)
dt.
The constraint on the tontine payout function d(t) is that the initial deposit of n should be
sufficient to sustain withdrawals in perpetuity. Of course, at some point all subscribers will
have died, so in fact the tontine sponsor will eventually be able to cease making payments,
leaving a small remainder or windfall. But this time is not predetermined, so we treat that
profit as an unavoidable feature of the tontine. Remember that we do not want to expose
the sponsor to any longevity risk. It is the pool that bears this risk entirely.
Our budget or pricing constraint is therefore that
(4)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t) dt = 1.
So, for example, if d(t) = d0 is forced to be constant (the historical structure, which we
call a flat tontine), then the tontine payout function (rate) is simply d0 = r (or somewhat
more if a cap on permissible ages is imposed, replacing the upper bound of integration in (4)
by a value less than infinity). We are instead searching for the optimal d(t) which we will
find is far from constant.
By the Euler-Lagrange theorem from the Calculus of Variations, there is a constant λ such
that the optimal d(t) satisfies
(5) e−rttpx
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
tp
k
x(1− tpx)n−1−k
n
k + 1
u′
(nd(t)
k + 1
)
= λe−rt
for every t. Note that this expression directly links individual utility u(·) to the optimal
participating annuity. Recall that a tontine is an extreme case of participation or pooling
of all longevity risk. Equation (5) dictates exactly how a risk-averse retiree will trade off
consumption against longevity risk. In other words, we are not advocating an ad hoc actuarial
process for smoothing realized mortality experience.
Note that an actual mortality hazard rate µx does not appear in the above equation – it
appears only implicitly, in both tpx and λ (which is determined by (4)). Therefore, we will
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simplify our notation by re-parametrizing in terms of the probability: Let Du(p) satisfy
(6) p
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k n
k + 1
u′
(nDu(p)
k + 1
)
= λ.
Substituting p = 1 into the above equation, it collapses to u′(Du(1)) = λ.
Theorem 2. The optimal tontine structure is d(t) = Du(tpx), where λ is chosen so (4)
holds.
It is feasible (but complicated) to solve this once a generic u is given. But in the case of
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility it simplifies greatly. Let u(c) = c1−γ/(1−γ)
if γ 6= 1, and when γ = 1 take u(c) = log c instead. Define
(7) θn,γ(p) = E
[( n
N(p)
)1−γ]
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
( n
k + 1
)1−γ
where N(p)− 1 ∼ Bin(n− 1, p). Set βn,γ(p) = pθn,γ(p). Then
Corollary 3. With CRRA utility, the optimal tontine has withdrawal rate DOTn,γ (p) = D
OT
n,γ (1)βn,γ(p)
1/γ,
where
(8) DOTn,γ (1) =
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)1/γ dt
]−1
.
Proof. Suppose γ 6= 1. Then the equation for DOTn,γ (p) becomes that
(9) DOTn,γ (p)
−γpθn,γ(p) = λ = DOTn,γ (1)
−γ.
The constraint (4) now implies (8). A similar argument applies when γ = 1. 
3.2. Payout Properties. It is worth emphasizing that DOTn,γ (p)/D
OT
n,γ (1) = βn,γ(p)
1/γ does
not depend on the particular form of the mortality hazard rate µx, or on the interest rate r,
but only on the longevity risk aversion γ and the number of initial subscribers to the tontine
pool, n. In other words, the mortality hazard rate and r enter into the expression for DOTn,γ (p)
only via the constant DOTn,γ (1). We will prove the following in section 7.1 of the appendix:
Lemma 4. For any n ≥ 2 and γ > 0
(a) βn,γ(p) increases with p;
(b) βn,γ(0) = 0 and βn,γ(1) = 1;
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(c) βn,1(p) = p,
βn,2(p) =
p
n
(1 + (n− 1)p),
βn,3(p) =
p
n2
(1 + 3(n− 1)p+ (n− 1)(n− 2)p2);
(d) limγ→∞ βn,γ(p) = pn and βn,0(p) = 1− (1− p)n;
(e) For 0 < p < 1 we have that
βn,γ(p) is
< pγ, if 0 < γ < 1> pγ, if 1 < γ.
One immediate consequence of Corollary 3 and (a) of Lemma 4 is that the optimal tontine
payout rate d(t) decreases with t.
By (d) we have that limγ→∞ βn,γ(p)1/γ = 1 for p > 0, so by dominated convergence,
DOTn,γ (1)
−1 =
∫∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)1/γ dt → 1r as γ → ∞. Therefore the (historical) flat tontine
structure D(p) = r is optimal in the limit as γ →∞.
Likewise limγ↓0 βn,γ(p)1/γ = 0 for p < 1. Renormalizing, this implies that DOTn,γ (p) concen-
trates increasingly near p = 1. In other words, as we approach risk-neutrality, the optimal
tontine comes closer and closer to exhausting itself immediately following t = 0.
We define a natural tontine to have payout d(t) = DN(tpx) where DN(p) is proportional
to p, just as is the case for the annuity payment per initial dollar invested. Comparing the
budget constraints (1) and (4), we get that DN(p) = pc0, so the natural tontine payout rate
agrees with that of the annuity (which justifies our singling it out). By Corollary 3 and
(c) of Lemma 4, we see that the natural tontine is optimal for logarithmic utility γ = 1.
We will see in Section 4 that the natural tontine is close to optimal when n is large. We
therefore propose the natural tontine as a reasonable structure for designing tontine products
in practice, rather than expecting insurers to offer a range of products with differing γ’s.
Figure 5 shows the ratio of DOTn,γ (p) to DN(p), with Gompertz hazard rate λ(t) =
1
b
e
x+t−m
b ,
and parametrized by t via p = tpx. This exponentially-rising hazard rate is the basic mortality
assumption in much of the actuarial literature. The figure provides numerical evidence that
higher risk aversion implies a preference for reducing consumption at early ages in favour of
reserving funds to consume at advanced ages. To make this statement precise, define
∆n,γ(t) =
∫ t
0
e−rsd(s) ds,
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namely the present value of payouts from the optimal tontine through time t, per initial
dollar invested (or equivalently, the proportion of initial capital used to fund payouts till
time t). We conjecture that
(10) γ1 > γ2 ⇒ ∆n,γ1(t) < ∆n,γ2(t),
in any realistic situation (specifically, whenever the morality distribution has an increasing
hazard rate). We have not yet succeeded in proving this conjecture, but instead will derive
a number of partial results that support it. In fact, numerical evidence suggests that (10)
holds regardless of the mortality distribution, provided γ1 is only of moderate size. It is in
fact possible to construct pathological mortality distributions for which (10) fails when γ1
and γ2 are large. Specifically, this may actually happen during a low-hazard rate lull between
two periods with high hazard rates. We discuss this at greater length in the appendix, where
we will also prove the following instances of the above conjecture.
Theorem 5. (10) holds in the following situations:
(a) For 0 < γ2 ≤ 1 ≤ γ1 and t > 0 arbitrary;
(b) For any fixed γ2, n, and t, in the limit as γ1 →∞;
(c) For some initial period of time t ∈ (0, t0), where t0 depends on γ1 > γ2 and n.
We will also prove a modified version of (10), for fixed γ1 > γ2 and t, in the limit as
n→∞ (see Theorem 12).
In Section 4 we will provide a variety of numerical examples that illustrate the optimal
tontine payout function d(t) as a function of longevity risk aversion γ and the initial size of
the tontine pool n.
3.3. Optimal Tontine Utility vs. Annuity Utility. We now compare the annuity and
tontine. Let UOTn,γ denote the utility of the optimal tontine. To compute this, suppose γ 6= 1,
and observe that
(11)
DOTn,γ (p)
1−γ
1− γ pθn,γ(p) =
DOTn,γ (p)
1− γ D
OT
n,γ (p)
−γpθn,γ(p) =
DOTn,γ (p)
1− γ D
OT
n,γ (1)
−γ
14 M.A. MILEVSKY AND T.S. SALISBURY
by (9). The utility of the optimal tontine is therefore precisely
UOTn,γ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
DOTn,γ (tpx)
1−γ
1− γ tpx θn,γ(tpx) dt =
DOTn,γ (1)
−γ
1− γ
∫ ∞
0
e−rtDOTn,γ (tpx) dt
=
DOTn,γ (1)
−γ
1− γ =
1
1− γ
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)1/γ dt
)γ
by (4) and (8).
Consider instead the utility UAγ provided by the annuity, namely
(12) UAγ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
c1−γ0
1− γ dt =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
(1− γ)
( ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)1−γ = 11− γ(
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)γ
.
Theorem 6. UOTn,γ < U
A
γ for any n and γ > 0.
Proof. For γ 6= 1 this follows from (e) of Lemma 4 and the calculations given above. We
show the case γ = 1 in the appendix. Of course, the conclusion is economically plausible, as
the tontine retains risk that the annuity doesn’t. 
3.4. Indifference Annuity Loading. The insurer offering an annuity will be modelled
as setting aside some fraction of the initial deposits to fund the annuity’s costs. In other
words, a fraction δ of the initial deposits are deducted initially, to fund risk management,
capital reserves, etc. The balance, invested at the risk-free rate r will fund the annuity.
Therefore, with loading, (1) becomes that
∫∞
0
e−rttpx c(t) dt = 1 − δ, which implies that
c(t) ≡ c1 = (1 − δ)c0 is the optimal payout structure for the annuity. The utility of the
loaded annuity is therefore
ULAγ,δ =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
c1−γ1
1− γ dt =
(1− δ)1−γ ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
(1− γ)
( ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)1−γ = c−γ01− γ (1− δ)1−γ
for γ 6= 1, and log(c0)+log(1−δ)
c0
for γ = 1.
In Section 4 we will consider numerically the indifference loading δ that, when applied to
the annuity, makes an individual indifferent between the annuity and a tontine, i.e. ULAγ,δ =
UOTn,γ . It turns out that the loading δ decreases with n, in such a way that the total loading
nδ stays roughly stable. In other words, there is at most a fixed amount (roughly) that the
insurer can deduct from the aggregate annuity pool, regardless of the number of participants,
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before individuals start to derive greater utility from the tontine. We will illustrate this
observation, at least for 1 < γ ≤ 2, by proving the following inequality in the appendix:
Theorem 7. Suppose that 1 < γ ≤ 2. Then δ < 1
n
(
c0
r
− 1).
Note that c0 > r, since c
−1
0 =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt <
∫∞
0
e−rt dt = r−1.
3.5. Additional Considerations. There are several issues we do not address here which
we openly acknowledge and leave for future research. In particular, there is the role of credit
risk as well as the impact of stochastic mortality which will change the dynamics between
tontines and annuities. The existence of credit risk is a much greater concern for the buyers of
life annuities, vs. tontines, given the risk assumed by the insurance sponsor. Likewise, under
a stochastic mortality model the tontine payout would be more variable and uncertain, which
might reduce the utility of the tontine relative to the life annuity. On the other hand, the
capital charges added to the market price of the life annuity would be higher in a stochastic
mortality model. We appreciate that these are an unanswered (or unaddressed) questions
and leave the examination of the robustness of the natural tontine payout in a full stochastic
mortality environment to a subsequent paper.
We note that there is also the question of asymmetric mortality, in which the individual
believes that his or her (subjective) hazard rate is less than that of the typical tontine
investor (for whom the tontine payout function is optimized). Indeed, this is potentially the
explanation for the significant fraction of investors in King William’s tontine, who did not
exercise their option to convert to an annuity. They (might have) thought their nominee was
much healthier than everyone else, and the only way to capitalize on that was to invest in the
tontine. This leads to the idea that the mortality loading, or level of asymmetric mortality,
would induce an individual to prefer the tontine to an annuity. This, obviously, ties into the
issue of stochastic mortality and is being addressed in a follow-up paper by Milevsky and
Salisbury (2015).
In the next section, we focus on the numerical implications of our current model.
4. Numerical Examples for the Optimal Tontine
Figure 1 displays the range of possible 4% flat tontine dividends over time, assuming
an initial pool of n = 400 nominees, under a Gompertz law of mortality with parameters
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m = 88.721 and b = 10. This mortality basis corresponds to a survival probability of
35p65 = 0.05, i.e. from age 65 to age 100 and is the baseline value for several of our numerical
examples. The figure clearly shows an increasing payment stream conditional on survival,
which isn’t the optimal function.
Figure 1 goes here
Indeed, in such a (traditional, historical) tontine scheme, the initial expected payment is
quite low, relative to what a life annuity might offer in the early years of retirement; while the
payment in the final years – for those fortunate enough to survive – would be both very high
and quite variable. It is not surprising then that this form of tontine is both suboptimal
from an economic utility point of view and also isn’t very appealing to individuals (with
reasonable risk aversions) who want to maximize their standard of living over their entire
retirement lifespan.
Figure 2 goes here
In contrast to Figure 1 which displays the sub-optimal flat tontine, Figure 2 displays the
range of outcomes from the optimal tontine payout function, under the same interest rate
and mortality basis. To be very specific, Figure 2 is computed by solving for the value of
DOTn,γ (1) and then constructing D
OT
n,γ (tpx) for n = 400, r = 0.04 and γ = 1. Once the payout
function is known for all t, the number of survivors at the 10th and 90th percentile of the
binomial distribution is used to bracket the range of the payout from age 65 to age 100.
Clearly, the expected payout per survivor is relatively constant over the retirement years,
which is much more appealing intuitively. Moreover, the discounted expected utility from a
tontine payout such as the one displayed in Figure 2 is much higher than the utility of the
one displayed in Figure 1.
Table 1 goes here
Table 1 displays the optimal tontine payout function for a very small pool of size n = 25.
These values correspond to the DOTn,γ (tpx) values derived in section 3. Notice how the optimal
tontine payout function is quite similar (identical in the first significant digit) regardless of
the individual’s Longevity Risk Aversion (LoRA) γ, even when the tontine pool is relatively
small at n = 25. The minimum guaranteed dividend starts off at about 7% at age 65 and
then declines to approximately 1% at age 95. Of course, the actual cash flow payout to
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an individual, conditional on being alive does not necessarily decline and in reality stays
relatively constant.
Table 2 goes here
Table 2 displays utility indifference loadings δ for a participant at age 60. Notice how even
a retiree with a very high level of Longevity Risk Aversion (LoRA) γ, will select a tontine
(with pool size n ≥ 20) instead of a life annuity if the insurance loading is greater than
7.5%; For less extreme levels of risk aversion, and larger pools, the required loading is much
smaller (e.g. 30 b.p.). Recall that this is a one-time charge at the time of initiation, not an
annualized value over the duration of the contract (which would be a significantly smaller
value).
Table 3 goes here
Table 3 computes certainty equivalent factors associated with natural tontines. See Section
7.3 for further discussion of this comparison. If an individual with LoRA γ 6= 1 is faced with
a tontine structure that is only optimal for someone with LoRA γ = 1 (i.e. logarithmic
utility) the welfare loss is minuscule. This is one reason we advocate the natural tontine
payout function, which is only precisely optimal for γ = 1, as the basis for 21st-century
tontines.
Figure 3 goes here
Figure 3 compares the optimal tontine payout function d(t) for different levels of Longevity
Risk Aversion γ, and shows that the difference is barely noticeable when the tontine pool
size is greater than n = 250, mainly due to the effect of the law of large numbers. This curve
traces the minimum dividend that a survivor can expect to receive at various ages (i.e. when
all purchasers survive). The median is (obviously) much higher (see Figure 2).
Figure 4 goes here
Figure 4 illustrates that the optimal tontine payout function for someone with logarithmic
γ = 1 utility starts off paying the exact same rate as a life annuity regardless of the number
of participants in the tontine pool, ie d(0) = c0. But, for higher levels of longevity risk
aversion γ and a relatively smaller tontine pool, the function starts off at a lower value and
declines at a slower rate. The perpetuity curve corresponds to γ =∞.
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Figure 5 goes here
Figure 5 shows that if we compare two retirees, the one who is more averse to longevity
risk will prefer a higher Guaranteed Minimum Payout Rate (GMPR) at advanced ages. In
exchange they will accept a lower GMPR at younger ages. We choose to quantify this by
taking the natural tontine payout as our baseline, since this is the product structure we
advocate. We take quite a small pool size here (n = 25) to illustrate the effect. The effect
persists at larger pool sizes, but is much less dramatic.
Figure 6 goes here
Figure 6 shows an actuarially-fair life annuity that guarantees 7.5% for life starting at age
65. It provides more utility than an optimal tontine regardless of Longevity Risk Aversion
(LoRA) or the size of the tontine pool. But, once an insurance loading is included, driving
the annuity yield under the initial payout from the optimal tontine, the utility of the life
annuity might be lower. The indifference loading is δ and is reported in Table 2.
So here is our main takeaway and idea in the paper, once again. The historical tontine
in which dividends to the entire pool are a constant (e.g. 4%) interest rate over the entire
retirement horizon are suboptimal because they create an increasing consumption profile
that is both variable and undesirable. However, a tontine scheme in which interest payments
to the pool early on are higher (e.g. 8%) and then decline over time, so that the few
winning centenarians receive a much lower interest rate (e.g. 1%) is in fact the optimal
design. Coincidently, King William’s 1693 tontine had a similar declining structure of interest
payments to the pool, which was quite rare historically.
We are careful to distinguish between the guaranteed interest rate (e.g. 8% or 1%) paid to
the entire pool, and the expected dividend to the individual investor in the optimal tontine,
which will be relatively constant over time, as is evident from Figure 2. Of course, the
present value of the interest paid to the entire pool over time is exactly equal to the original
contribution made by the pool itself. We are simply re-arranging and parsing cash flows of
identical present value, in a different manner over time.
We have shown that a tontine provides less utility than an actuarially-fair life annuity,
which is reasonable given that the tontine exposes investors to longevity risk. What is
striking is that the utility difference from a properly-designed tontine scheme is actually
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quite small when compared to an actuarially-fair life annuity, which is the workhorse of the
pension economics and lifecycle literature. In fact, the utility from a tontine might actually
be higher than the utility generated by a pure life annuity when the insurance (commission,
capital cost, etc.) one-time loading exceeds 10%. This result should not negate or be viewed
as conflicting with the wide-ranging annuity literature which proves the optimality of life
annuities in a lifecycle model. Both tontines and annuities hedge idiosyncratic mortality
risk. In fact, what we show is that it is still optimal to fully hedge the remaining systemic
longevity risk, but the instrument that one uses to do so depends on the relative costs. In
other words, sharing longevity risk amongst a relatively small (n ≤ 100) pool of people
doesn’t create large dis-utilities or welfare losses, at least within a classical rational model.
This finding can also be viewed as a further endorsement of the participating life annuity,
which lies in between the tontine and the conventional life annuity.
5. Literature Review
This is not the place – nor do we have the space – for a full review of the literature on
tontines, so we provide a selected list of key articles for those interested in further reading.
For literature and all sources available for the 1693 tontine, we refer to the earlier mentioned
historical paper by Milevsky (2014) as well as the book by Milevsky (2015).
More generally, the original tontine proposal by Lorenzo de Tonti appears in French in
Tonti (1654) (and in English translation in the cited reference). The review article by Kopf
(1927) and the book by O’Donnell (1936) are quite dated, but document how the historical
tontine operated, discussing its checkered history, and providing a readable biography of
some of its earliest promoters in Denmark, Holland, France and England. The monograph by
Cooper (1972) is devoted entirely to tontines and the foundations of the 19th-century (U.S.)
tontine insurance industry, which is based on the tontine concept but is somewhat different
because of the savings and lapsation component. In a widely-cited article, Ransom and Sutch
(1987) provide the background and story of the banning of tontine insurance in New York
State, and then eventually the entire U.S. The comprehensive monograph by Jennings and
Trout (1982) reviews the history of tontines, with particular emphasis on the French period,
while carefully documenting payout rates and yields from most known tontines. For those
interested in the pricing of mortality-contingent claims during the 17th and 18th century, as
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well as the history and background of the people involved, see Alter (1986), Poitras (2000),
Hald (2003), Poterba (2005), Ciecka (2008a, 2008b), Rothschild (2009) as well as Bellhouse
(2011), and of course, Homer and Sylla (2005) for the relevant interest rates.
More recently, the newspaper article by Chancellor (2001), the book by Lewin (2003) and
especially the recent review by McKeever (2009) all provide a very good history of tontines
and discuss the possibility of a tontine revival. The standard actuarial textbooks, such as
Promislow (2011) or Pitacco, et al. (2009) for example, each have a few pages devoted to
the historical tontine principal.
More relevant to the modern design of participating annuities and sharing longevity risk
in the 21st century, a series of recent papers on pooled annuity funds have resurrected the
topic. For example Piggot, Valdez and Detzel (2005), Valdez, Piggott and Wang (2006),
Stamos (2008), Richter and Weber (2011), Donnelly, Guillen and Nielsen (2013) as well as
Qiao and Sherris (2013) have all attempted to reintroduce and analyze tontine-like structures
in one form or another. In these proposed structures, investors contribute to an initial pool
of capital, which is invested, and then paid out over time to the survivors. It need not be
the case that investments are risk free (as we have assumed for the tontines we analyze), so
the control variables are the asset allocation and payout strategy. The prospectus given to
pooled annuity investors should therefore specify both.
Donnelly, Guillen and Nielsen (2013) consider a different approach, in the context of
pooled annuities, to what we above have called the indifference annuity loading. Instead
of the loading being payed in a lump sum at the time of purchase (as we have done), they
incorporate a variable fee into their guaranteed product, paid continuously over time. They
find that this fee may be structured so the utility of the pooled annuity precisely matches that
of the guaranteed product it is being compared to, at all times. They term this fee structure
the “lifetime breakeven costs”, and explore its properties and implications for consumption.
To further compare with our results, let us assume for now that the pooled annuity funds
are indeed invested risk-free. Following the argument of Stamos (2008), one would then
obtain the optimal proportion of the remaining funds that should be paid out at each time,
as a function of both time and the number of individuals remaining in the pool. In a tontine,
the amount withdrawn may vary with time, but not with the number of survivors. In other
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words, the prospectus for a tontine should lay out a specific dollar amount to be withdrawn
in each year of the contract, so any uncertainty in the amount paid to an individual derives
simply from the size of the pool with whom the withdrawal is split. A pooled annuity has the
latter uncertainty, but in addition has uncertainty about the dollar amount to be withdrawn,
which will vary in a path-dependent way according to how the mortality experience of the
pool evolves. To know how much you will receive in year 10, it is no longer enough to know
how many survivors there are in year 10, but you also need to know how many survived in
each of years one through nine.
There are both advantages and disadvantages to pooled annuities versus tontines. On the
plus side, the pooled annuity has an extra variable to control for, so should yield higher utility
– with risk-free investing we expect its utility to be intermediate between that of a tontine and
an annuity. As we have seen, the latter are in fact very close, so the utility gain (though real)
is actually modest. On the down side, the path-dependent nature of a pooled annuity (or the
annuity overlay introduced by Donnelly et. al. (2014)) makes it more complex to explain to
participants, and more difficult for those participants to evaluate the risks and uncertainties
of their income stream. For these reasons, we (on balance) advocate tontines. The simpler
design of tontines certainly makes their calculations less computationally intensive. At a
mathematical level, it also allows us to go further in analyzing their properties, which is an
important component of the current paper.
The closest other work we can find to our natural tontine payout is that of Sabin (2010)
on a fair annuity tontine. He gives a specific interpretation of “fair” and analyzes how to
adjust tontine payments for heterogeneous ages and initial contributions. A related fairness
question for pooled annuities is treated in Donnelly (2015). Our natural tontine is “fair” by
construction because we don’t mix cohorts or ages.
In sum, although research on tontine schemes is scattered across the insurance, actuarial,
economic, and history journals, we have come across few, if any, scholarly articles that
condemn or dismiss the tontine concept outright. 13
13See recent papers on optimal insurance design, such as Bernard et. al. (2015) and references therein,
which focus on traditional risks as opposed to retirement income products. Likewise, Dai, Kwok and Zong
(2008) examine the optimal utilization of GLWBs, but not on optimal design.
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6. Conclusion and Relevance
It is not widely known that in the year 1790, the first U.S. Secretary of the Treasury,
Alexander Hamilton proposed one of the largest tontines in history. To help reduce a crushing
national debt – something that is clearly not a recent phenomenon – he suggested the U.S.
government replace high-interest revolutionary war debt with new bonds in which coupon
payments would be made to a group, as opposed to individuals14. The group members would
share the interest payments evenly amongst themselves, provided they were alive. But, once
a member of the group died, his or her portion would stay in a pool and be shared amongst
the survivors. This process would theoretically continue until the very last survivor would be
entitled to the entire interest payment – potentially millions of dollars. This obscure episode
in U.S. history has become known as Hamilton’s Tontine Proposal, which he claimed – in a
letter to George Washington – would reduce the interest paid on U.S. debt, and eventually
eliminate it entirely.
Although Congress decided not to act on Hamilton’s proposal 15 the tontine idea itself never
died on American soil. U.S. insurance companies began issuing tontine insurance policies –
which are close cousins to de Tonti’s tontine – to the public in the mid-19th century, and
they became wildly popular16. By the start of the 20th century, historians have documented
that half of U.S. households owned a tontine insurance policy, which many used to support
themselves through retirement. The longer one lived, the greater their payments. This
was a personal hedge against longevity, with little risk exposure for the insurance company.
Sadly though, due to shenanigans and malfeasance on the part of company executives, the
influential New York State Insurance Commission banned tontine insurance in the state, and
by 1910 most other states followed. Tontines have been illegal in the U.S. for over a century
and most insurance executives have likely never heard of them.
Tontines not only have a fascinating history but have some basis in economic principles,
In fact, Adam Smith himself, writing in the Wealth of Nations, noted that tontines may be
14Source: Jennings, Swanson and Trout (1988).
15Hamilton left public life in disgrace after admitting to an affair with a married woman, and soon after
died in a duel with Aaron Burr, the U.S. vice president at the time
16Source: Ransom and Sutch (1987).
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preferred to life annuities. We believe that a strong case can be made for overturning the
current ban on tontine insurance – allowing both tontine and annuities to co-exist as they
did 320 years ago – with suitable adjustments to alleviate problems encountered in the early
20th century. Indeed, given the insurance industry’s concern for longevity risk capacity, and
its poor experience in managing the risk of long-dated fixed guarantees, one can argue that
an (optimal) tontine annuity is a “triple win” proposition for individuals, corporations and
governments. See Milevsky (2015) for further arguments along this line.
It is worth noting that under the proposed (EU) Solvency II guidelines for insurer’s cap-
ital as well as risk management, there is a renewed focus on total balance sheet risks. In
particular, insurers will be required to hold more capital against market risk, credit risk and
operational risk. In fact, a recently-released report Moody’s (2013) claims that solvency
ratios will exhibit a more complex volatility under Solvency II than under Solvency I, as
both the available capital and the capital requirements will change with market conditions.
According to many commentators this is likely to translate into higher consumer prices for
insurance products with long-term maturities and guarantees. And, although this only ap-
plies to European companies (at this point time), it is not unreasonable to conclude that
in a global market, annuity loadings will increase, making (participating) tontine products
relatively more appealing to price-sensitive consumers.
Moreover, perhaps a properly-designed tontine product could help alleviate the low levels
of voluntary annuity purchases – a.k.a. the annuity puzzle – by gaming the behavioral biases
and prejudices exhibited by retirees. The behavioral economics literature and advocates
of cumulative prospect theory have argued that consumers make decisions based on more
general value functions with personalized decision weights. Among other testable hypotheses,
this leads to a preference for investments with (highly) skewed outcomes, even when the
alternative is a product with the same expected present values17. Of course, whether the
public and regulators can be convinced of these benefits remains to be seen, but a debate
would be informative.
17Source: Barberis (2013).
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We are not alone in this quest. Indeed, during the last decade a number of companies
around the world – egged on by scholars and journalists18 – have tried to resuscitate the
tontine concept while trying to avoid the bans and taints. Although the specific designs differ
from proposal to proposal, all share the same idea we described in this paper: Companies act
as custodians and guarantee very little. This arrangement requires less capital which then
translates into more affordable pricing for the consumer. Once again the main qualitative
insight from our model is that a properly-designed tontine could hold its own in the utility
arena, against an actuarially-fair life annuity and pose a real challenge to a loaded annuity.
The next (natural) step would be to examine the robustness of our results in a full-blown
stochastic mortality model.
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7. Appendix and proofs
7.1. Basic Properties. The bulk of this section consists of proofs of results from Section
3.2 To simplify notation, we use as few subscripts as possible, and write θ(p) = θn,γ(p),
β(p) = βγ(p) = βn,γ(p), or D(p) = D
OT
n,γ (p), as long as the meaning is clear. We start with
some calculations for the binomial distribution
Lemma 8. d
dp
E[f(N(p))] = 1
p
E[g(N(p))], where g(k) = (k − 1)(f(k)− f(k − 1)).
Proof.
d
dp
E[f(N(p))] =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
f(k + 1)
[
kpk−1(1− p)n−k−1 − (n− k − 1)pk(1− p)n−k−2
]
=
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)
pk−1(1− p)n−k−1kf(k + 1)
−
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k + 1
)
pk(1− p)n−k−2(k + 1)f(k + 1)
=
1
p
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k−1k[f(k + 1)− f(k)].

Lemma 9. E[ n
N(p)
] = 1−(1−p)
n
p
< 1
p
.
Proof.
E
[ n
N(p)
]
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k n
k + 1
=
1
p
n−1∑
k=0
(
n
k + 1
)
pk+1(1− p)n−(k+1) = 1
p
[1− (1− p)n] < 1
p
.

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Proof of Lemma 4. Parts (b) and (c) are elementary calculations. To see (a), apply Lemma
8 to obtain that
β′(p) =
d
dp
E[(N/n)γ−1] =
1
nγ−1
(
E[Nγ−1] + p · 1
p
E[(N − 1)(Nγ−1 − (N − 1)γ−1)]
)
=
1
nγ−1
E[Nγ − (N − 1)γ] > 0.
The first statement of (d) holds, because E[(N/n)γ−1] → P (N = n) = pn−1. The second
part of (d) follows from Lemma 9.
Now define
Rγ(p) =
βγ(p)
1/γ
p
,
so R1(p) = 1. Consider the following:
Lemma 10. Rγ(p) is increasing in γ. It is increasing in p if 0 < γ < 1, and is decreasing
in p if γ > 1.
Once this is established, the monotonicity of Rγ in γ immediately implies (e), completing
the proof of Lemma 4. It is worth noting that for 2 ≤ γ there is a simpler proof of (e), since
θ(p) = E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1]
≥ E
[N(p)
n
]γ−1
=
(1 + (n− 1)p
n
)γ−1
=
(
p+
1− p
n
)γ−1
> pγ−1
by Jensen, implying β(p) = pθ(p) > pγ. 
Proof of Lemma 10. Let 0 < γ2 < γ1. Define Q by
dQ
dP
= pn
N
. By Lemma 9, Q is a sub-
probability. Set b = γ1
γ2
> 1. By Holder,
βγ2(p) = pE
[(N(p)
n
)γ2−1] = EQ[(N(p)
n
)γ2] ≤ EQ[(N(p)
n
)γ2b] 1bEQ[1]1− 1b
< EQ
[(N(p)
n
)γ1]γ2/γ1 = (pE[(N(p)
n
)γ1−1])γ2/γ1 = βγ1(p)γ2/γ1 .
Taking a 1/γ2 power and dividing by p now shows that Rγ2(p) ≤ Rγ1(p).
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To show the monotonicity properties of Rγ with respect to p, it suffices to show the same
for logRγ. As in the proof of (a) of Lemma 4,
d
dp
logRγ(p) =
β′(p)
γβ(p)
− 1
p
=
1
γβ(p)
[
β′(p)− γβ(p)
p
]
=
1
γβ(p)nγ−1
E
[
N(p)γ − (N(p)− 1)γ − γN(p)γ−1
]
.
By Taylor’s theorem, kγ − (k − 1)γ − γkγ−1 = −γ(γ−1)
2
ξγ−2 for some ξ. This is < 0 when
γ > 1 and > 0 if 0 < γ < 1, which completes the proof. 
Turning to conjecture (10), define
Rγ1,γ2(p) =
βγ1(p)
1/γ1
βγ2(p)
1/γ2
,
so Rγ(p) = Rγ,1(p) and Rγ1,γ2(1) = 1. For Q as in the proof of Lemma 10, an application of
Holder’s inequality (as in that proof) shows that
(13) Rγ1,γ2(p) = EQ[(N(p)/n)
γ1 ]1/γ1/EQ[(N(p)/n)
γ2 ]1/γ2 ≥ 1,
when γ1 > γ2.
Lemma 11. Assume Rγ1,γ2(p) decreases with p, for some given n and γ1 > γ2. Then (10)
also holds. In other words, ∆n,γ1(t) < ∆n,γ2(t) for every t > 0.
Proof. There is a constant C [depending on n, γ1, γ2, and the mortality parameters] such
that Dγ1(p) = CDγ2(p)Rγ1,γ2(p) for each p. Therefore
∆n,γ1(t)−∆n,γ2(t) =
∫ t
0
e−rsDγ2(spx)
[
CRγ1,γ2(spx)− 1
]
ds.
By (4), this → 1 − 1 = 0 in the limit as t → ∞, so the integrand must take both positive
and negative values. By (13) we have Rγ1,γ2)(spx) ≥ 1 for each s, so 0 < C < 1. Therefore
CRγ1,γ2(spx)−1 starts out negative, and then increases with s, eventually becoming positive.
By hypothesis, once it becomes positive, it stays so. There is thus a t0 such that the integrand
is negative for s < t0 and positive for s > t0. In other words, ∆n,γ1(t)−∆n,γ2(t) is decreasing
on [0, t0] and increasing on [t0,∞). Since ∆n,γ1(0)−∆n,γ2(0) = 0 and ∆n,γ1(t)−∆n,γ2(t)→ 0
when t→∞, we see that ∆n,γ1(t)−∆n,γ2(t) < 0 for every t > 0, as required. 
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Proof of Theorem 5. For part (a), let γ1 ≥ 1 ≥ γ2 > 0, with γ1 6= γ2. Then Rγ1,γ2(p) = Rγ1 (p)Rγ2 (p)
decreases with p, by the second statement of Lemma 10. Now apply Lemma 11
To show part (b) it suffices to show that R∞,γ2(p) is decreasing in p. This follows from
(a) and (d) of Lemma 4, since R∞,γ2(p) = 1/βγ2(p)
1/γ2 . Part (c) is implicit in the proof of
Lemma 11, since the hypothesis of that result is not used in showing that ∆n,γ1(t)−∆n,γ2(t)
initially decreases. 
Numerical evidence (not reported here) suggests that there is a γ0 (≈ 7) such that Rγ1,γ2(p)
is decreasing in p whenever γ0 > γ1 > γ2. By Lemma 11, this would imply (10) for these
parameters, without any restriction on the underlying mortality distribution. However, for
larger γ values, Rγ1,γ2(p) can in fact increase over a small range of p’s. For example, with
n = 2, γ1 = 10 and γ2 = 9, it increases over the range p ∈ [0.00098, 0.00394]. This defect
in R for very small p does not appear significant enough to cause (10) to fail under any
reasonable mortality distribution. But it is in fact possible to construct a pathological
mortality distribution for which (10) fails, by making tpx spend essentially all of its time in
the above range of p’s. However, this distribution’s hazard rate will not be monotone, since
we achieve it by taking the hazard rate low over the above range of p’s, and high elsewhere.
Asymptotics in n are problematic, because of the need to estimate β(p) for p very small.
We circumvent this difficulty by capping tontine payments at some advanced age x+T . For
a tontine running T years, the optimal payout d˜(t) will maximize
∫ T
0
e−rsspx
d˜(s)1−γ
1−γ θγ(spx) ds
over d˜ satisfying the constraint
∫ T
0
e−rsd˜(s) ds = 1. The arguments of Corollary 3 now show
that
d˜(t) =
βγ(tpx)
1/γ∫ T
0
e−rsβγ(spx)1/γ ds
.
We now set ∆˜n,γ(t) =
∫ t
0
e−rsd˜(s) ds, and can prove the following asymptotic version of (10).
Theorem 12. Let γ1 > γ2. For every  > 0 there is an n0 such that ∆˜n,γ1(t) < ∆˜n,γ2(t) for
each t ∈ [, T − ] and n ≥ n0.
Proof. We start by establishing a number of estimates. Fix γ > 0, 1 > η > 0, 1 > p1 > 0,
and C1 > 0. We may then find n1 such that if n ≥ n1 and 1 ≥ p ≥ p1 then 2(1 ∨
n1−γ)e−
1
2
(n−1)η2p2 ≤ C1
n3/2
. Recall Azuma’s inequality (see for example Steele (1997)), in the
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form that if B ∼ Bin(k, p) then P (|B
k
− p| > b) ≤ 2e− 12kb2 . Observe that 1
n
≤ N(p)
n
≤ 1, and
set k = n− 1, B = N(p)− 1, and µ = p+ 1−p
n
. It follows that if n ≥ n1 and 1 ≥ p ≥ p1 then
(14) E
[∣∣N(p)
n
∣∣γ−1, ∣∣N(p)
n
− µ∣∣ > ηp] ≤ (1 ∨ n1−γ)P(∣∣B − kp
n
∣∣ > ηp)
≤ (1 ∨ n1−γ)P
(∣∣B
k
− p∣∣ > ηp) ≤ C1
n3/2
.
Likewise, if n ≥ n1 and 1 ≥ p ≥ p1 then E[|N(p)n −µ|a, |N(p)n −µ| > ηp] ≤ C1n3/2 for each a ≥ 0,
so
(15) E
[(N(p)
n
− µ
)a
,
∣∣N(p)
n
− µ∣∣ ≤ ηp] =

1 + e0, a = 0
e1, a = 1
kp(1−p)
n2
+ e2, a = 2
where in each case |ei| ≤ C1n3/2 .
By Azuma’s inequality again,
E
[∣∣N(p)
n
− µ∣∣3] = ∫ ∞
0
P
(∣∣N(p)
n
− µ∣∣3 > q) dq = ∫ ∞
0
P
(∣∣B − kp
n
∣∣ > q1/3) dq
≤
∫ ∞
0
P
(∣∣B
k
− p∣∣ > q1/3) dq ≤ 2 ∫ ∞
0
e−
1
2
kq2/3 dq(16)
=
6
k3/2
∫ ∞
0
e−
1
2
z2z2 dz =
3
√
2pi
k3/2
.
By Taylor’s theorem,
E
[(N
n
)γ−1
,
∣∣N
n
−µ∣∣ ≤ ηp] = E[µγ−1+(γ−1)µγ−2(N
n
−µ
)
+
(γ − 1)(γ − 2)
2
µγ−3
(N
n
−µ
)2
+
(γ − 1)(γ − 2)(γ − 3)
6
ξγ−4
(N
n
− µ
)3
,
∣∣N
n
− µ∣∣ ≤ ηp]
where ξ lies between (1− η)µ and (1 + η)µ. Applying (14), (15), and (16) yields a constant
C2 such that if n ≥ n1 and 1 ≥ p ≥ p1 then
E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1]
= µγ−1 +
(γ − 1)(γ − 2)
2
µγ−3
kp(1− p)
n2
+ e4,
where |e4| ≤ C2n3/2 . Since µ = p+ 1−pn it is now immediate that for these n’s and p’s, also
E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1]
= pγ−1 +
γ(γ − 1)(1− p)
2n
pγ−2 + e5 = pγ−1
(
1 +
γ(γ − 1)(1− p)
2np
+
e5
pγ−1
)
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where |e5| ≤ C3n3/2 for some constant C3. By passing to some n2 ≥ n1 if necessary, we obtain
finally that
(17) βγ(p)
1/γ =
(
pE
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1])1/γ
= p
(
1 +
(γ − 1)(1− p)
2np
+ e6
)
= p
(
1− (γ − 1)
2n
)
+
γ − 1
2n
+ pe6
for n ≥ n2 and 1 ≥ p ≥ p1, where |e6| ≤ C4n3/2 , and C4 is a constant depending on γ and p1.
To apply this, fix γ1 > γ2, set p1 = Tpx, and choose n2 and C4 to ensure that (17) holds
for both γ1 and γ2. For any 0 < t < T , the inequality ∆˜n,γ1(t) < ∆˜n,γ2(t) is equivalent to
the following:
(18)
∫ t
0
e−rsβγ1(spx)
1/γ1 ds×
∫ T
0
e−rqβγ2(qpx)
1/γ2 dq
<
∫ t
0
e−rsβγ2(spx)
1/γ2 ds×
∫ T
0
e−rqβγ1(qpx)
1/γ1 dq.
Set F (t) =
∫ t
0
e−rsspx ds and G(t) =
∫ t
0
e−rs ds. Using (17), we have an upper bound of[
F (t)(1− (γ1 − 1)
2n
)
+G(t)
γ1 − 1
2n
][
F (T )(1− (γ2 − 1)
2n
)
+G(T )
γ2 − 1
2n
]
+
C5
n3/2
for the left side of (18) (for some constant C5), provided n ≥ n2. There is likewise a lower
bound[
F (t)(1− (γ2 − 1)
2n
)
+G(t)
γ2 − 1
2n
][
F (T )(1− (γ1 − 1)
2n
)
+G(T )
γ1 − 1
2n
]
− C6
n3/2
for the right side (for some constant C6), again provided n ≥ n2. Thus (18) will hold for t
and n, provided n ≥ n2 and
C5 + C6
n3/2
<
γ1 − γ2
2n
[
F (t)G(T )−G(t)F (T )
]
.
It is easily seen that F (t)G(T ) − G(t)F (T ) = ∫ t
0
∫ T
t
e−r(s+q)(spx − qpx) dq ds, and it follows
that F (t)G(T ) − G(t)F (T ) > 0 on (0, T ). It is therefore clear how to choose n0 ≥ n2 to
ensure that the desired conclusion holds. 
We close this section with the proof of the result in Section 3.3
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Proof of Theorem 6. As remarked earlier, the case γ 6= 1 follows immediately from (e) of
Lemma 4. When γ = 1, we have u(c) = log c so UOTn,1 =
∫∞
0
e−rttpxE[log(
nc0 tpx
N(tpx)
)] dt, while
UA1 =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx log(c0) dt. Therefore
UA1 − UOTn,1 =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
(
E
[
log
(N(tpx)
n
)]− log(tpx)) dt.
The following result now completes the proof. 
Lemma 13. E[log(N(p))] > log(np) for 0 < p < 1.
Proof. By Holder, E
[
( n
N(p)
)a
]1/a
increases with a. By Lemma 9 and l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
1
p
> lim
a↓0
E[(
n
N(p)
)a]1/a = elima↓0
1
a
logE[( n
N(p)
)a]
= elima↓0 E[(
n
N(p)
)a log( n
N(p)
)]/E[( n
N(p)
)a] = e−E[log(
N(p)
n
)].
Taking log’s shows the result. 
7.2. Indifference Loading.
Proof of Theorem 7. Since 1 < γ ≤ 2, cγ−1 is concave in c, so lies below its tangents.
Therefore
θ(p) = E
[(N(p)
n
)γ−1]
≤ E
[
pγ−1 + (γ − 1)pγ−2
(N
n
− p
)]
= pγ−1 + (γ − 1)pγ−21− p
n
.
c1/γ is also strictly concave in c, so in the same way
β(p)
1
γ = (pθ(p))
1
γ < (pγ)
1
γ +
1
γ
(pγ)
1
γ
−1 · (γ − 1)pγ−11− p
n
= p+
(γ − 1)(1− p)
γn
.
Therefore ∫ ∞
0
e−rtβ(tpx)
1
γ dt <
1
c0
+
γ − 1
γn
(1
r
− 1
c0
)
.
By definition,
c−γ0
1− γ (1− δ)
1−γ =
1
1− γ
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtβ(tpx)1/γ dt
)γ
,
and 1− c γ1−γ is also concave in c, so as before
δ = 1−
(
c0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtβ(tpx)
1
γ dt
) γ
1−γ · < − γ
1− γ ·
γ − 1
γn
(c0
r
− 1
)
=
1
n
(c0
r
− 1
)
.

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For any γ one can derive (using the second moment of N(p) now, as in the proof of
Theorem 12) the asymptotic result that δn → γ
2
( co
r
− 1). But convergence turns out to be
so slow that this precise asymptotic is of limited use. The slow convergence derives from the
observation that, with Gompertz mortality, the time t till tpx reaches
1
n
grows only at rate
b log log n. (For the same reason, numerical computations are best carried out using log(tpx)
rather than tpx.) For example, with γ = 2, r = 3%, age x = 50, and Gompertz parameters
m = 87.25 and b = 9.5, we obtain γ
2
( co
r
− 1) = 0.6593; But for n = 10, 100, or 1000 we only
have δn = 0.2858, 0.3377, and 0.3671; In fact, even with n = 7 × 109 tontine participants
(roughly the world’s entire population) we would only reach δn = 0.4417.
Asymptotics become more reliable if tontine and annuity payments are capped at some
advanced age x+T , as in Theorem 12. The new loading δ˜ now satisfies δ˜n→ γ
2
( c˜o
r
(1−e−rT )−
1), where c˜0 is the payout from the capped annuity. With the same parameters as above
and capping at age 120 it still takes n = 100,000 to give nδ˜ = 0.4012 (well approximating
the n = ∞ value of 0.4301). Convergence is more rapid with smaller T ’s: with capping at
age 110 we only need n = 1,000 to give nδ˜ = 0.3642 (approximating 0.3850) and for age 100
capping, even n = 100 yields 0.2855 (approximating 0.2897).
7.3. Certainty Equivalents and the Natural Tontine. In Table 3 we compare the wel-
fare loss experienced by an individual with Longevity Risk Aversion γ 6= 1, if they participate
in a natural tontine rather than an optimal one. To do so we calculate the ratio Γ ≥ 1 of the
certainty equivalents of the two tontines. This represents the initial deposit into a natural
tontine needed to provide the same utility as a $1 deposit into an optimal one. In this
section, we discuss this comparison further.
The natural tontine has utility
UNn,γ =
c1−γ0
1− γ
∫ ∞
0
e−rttp2−γx θn,γ(tpx) dt.
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Therefore
Γ =
[
UOTn,γ
UNn,γ
] 1
1−γ
=
[
DOTn,γ (1)
−γ
c1−γ0
∫∞
0
e−rttp
2−γ
x θn,γ(tpx) dt
] 1
1−γ
=
( ∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt
)( ∫∞
0
e−rtβn,γ(tpx)
1
γ dt)
γ
1−γ( ∫∞
0
e−rttp
2−γ
x θn,γ(tpx) dt
) 1
1−γ
.
When we compute these values numerically, for 0 < γ ≤ 2, we get values quite close to 1.
Moreover, if we let n→∞, then βn,γ(p)1/γ → p and θn,γ(p)→ p−(1−γ), which makes Γ→ 1
asymptotically, as long as γ ≤ 2.
For γ > 2 this is not a fair comparison, as the integral diverges and UNn,γ =∞. It is worth
understanding why. The integrand in the numerator involves [pθn,γ(p)]
1/γ ∼ p 1γn 1−γγ which
is well behaved as p → 0. The denominator integrand involves p2−γθn,γ(p) however, which
can be large while p → 0, if γ > 2. This means that for γ > 2 the natural tontine utility
is unduly influenced by the possibility of living to highly advanced ages. Even if there is
only a single survivor, that survivor’s payout will have dropped to quite low levels by the
time it is actually improbable that anyone will live that long. And for γ > 2 the negative
consequences of the low payout dominate the small probability of surviving that long.
Capping tontine payouts at an advanced age x + T , as in Theorem 12, would enable
comparisons for γ > 2. For example, take age x = 60 and let us compare with the certainty
equivalent Γ = 1.0034 at that age from Table 3 (ie. with n = 100 and γ = 2). Capping
payouts at age 100, we can achieve Γ˜ = 1.0032 for γ = 4 even with n = 50, and Γ˜ = 1.0037
for γ = 10 by going to n = 300. With the capping age raised to 110 and γ = 4, it instead
takes n = 1400 to achieve a comparable Γ˜ = 1.0032
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Optimal Tontine Payout Function: Pool of Size n = 25
LoRA (γ) Payout Age 65 Payout Age 80 Payout Age 95
0.5 7.565% 5.446% 1.200%
1.0 7.520% 5.435% 1.268%
1.5 7.482% 5.428% 1.324%
2.0 7.447% 5.423% 1.374%
4.0 7.324% 5.410% 1.541%
9.0 7.081% 5.394% 1.847%
Survival 0p65 =100% 15p65 =72.2% 30p65 =16.8%
Notes: Assumes r = 4% and Gompertz Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10)
Table 1. Shows the optimal tontine payout function d(t) = DOTn,γ (tpx) at
various ages. Note how insensitive it is to Longevity Risk Aversion γ, even for
a small pool (n = 25).
.
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.
The Highest Annuity Loading δ You Are Willing to Pay
If a Tontine Pool of Size n is Available
LoRA γ n = 20 n = 100 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 5000
0.5 72.6 b.p. 14.5 b.p. 2.97 b.p. 1.50 b.p. 0.30 b.p.
1.0 129.8 b.p. 27.4 b.p. 5.74 b.p. 2.92 b.p. 0.60 b.p.
1.5 182.4 b.p. 39.8 b.p. 8.45 b.p. 4.31 b.p. 0.89 b.p.
2.0 231.7 b.p. 51.8 b.p. 11.1 b.p. 5.68 b.p. 1.18 b.p.
3.0 323.1 b.p. 75.1 b.p. 16.3 b.p. 8.38 b.p. 1.75 b.p.
9.0 753.6 b.p. 199.8 b.p. 45.9 b.p. 23.8 b.p. 5.09 b.p.
Assumes Age x = 60, r = 3% and Gompertz Mortality (m = 87.25, b = 9.5)
Table 2. If the risk loading δ the annuity charges up front is higher than
these amounts, the tontine is preferred.
.
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Natural vs. Optimal Tontine
Certainty Equivalent for n = 100
Age x γ = 0.5 γ = 1 γ = 2
30 1.000018 1 1.000215
40 1.000026 1 1.000753
50 1.000041 1 1.001674
60 1.000067 1 1.003388
70 1.000118 1 1.003451
80 1.000225 1 1.009877
r = 3% and Gompertz m = 87.25, b = 9.5
Table 3. This shows how much must be invested in a natural tontine to
match $1 invested in a tontine optimized for the individual’s LoRA γ.
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Figure 1. The range of d0 = 4% tontine dividends during the first few
decades of retirement is relatively low and predictable for a pool size in the
hundreds. The dividends increase exponentially at later ages and the 80%
range is much wider as well. But this is not the only way to construct a tontine.
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Figure 2. The optimal tontine pays survivors a cash value that is expected to
remain relatively constant over time, conditional on survival; although the 80%
range of outcomes does increase at higher ages given the inherent uncertainty
in the number of survivors from an initial pool of n = 400. This structure is
optimal for logarithfig3mic γ = 1 utility and nearly optimal for all other levels
of Longevity Risk Aversion.
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Figure 3. The difference between the optimal tontine payout function d(t)
for different levels of Longevity Risk Aversion γ is barely noticeable once the
tontine pool size is greater than n = 250.
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Figure 4. The optimal tontine payout function for someone with logarithmic
γ = 1 utility starts off paying the exact same rate as a life annuity regardless
of the number of participants in the tontine pool. But, for higher levels of
longevity risk aversion γ and a relatively smaller tontine pool, the function
starts off at a lower value and declines at a slower rate
.
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Figure 5. The ratio DOTn,γ (tpx)/DN(tpx) of the optimal tontine payout to the
natural tontine payout. This is flat for γ = 1 since the natural tontine is
optimal for logarithmic utility, but for rising γ we see increased reserving
against the risk of living longer than expected.
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Figure 6. Shows an actuarially fair life annuity, and a natural tontine payout
(LoRA γ = 1). They agree at t = 0, but the tontine pays more at time zero
once loading is included. The utility of the loaded life annuity may be lower
than that of the tontine, depending on the size of the loading.
